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Bridging climate science, citizens, and policy


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Climate Links: Resilient Arctic & Pacific Decadal Oscillation

Items that caught my eye this morning on Twitter:

Scientists: Arctic Is More Resilient To Global Warming Than We Thought” Who is “We” and why did “we” think the Arctic wasn’t resilient?  The second is easier to answer: because climate scientists with bullhorns told us for years that the Arctic was “DOOMED!”  I’ve written about this topic and knew when the record low extent and volume occurred in 2012 that it was likely one bad year and not the end of the world.  I haven’t seen or heard from those same scientists who breathlessly told the public about the doomed Arctic in 2012 that they were wrong (boy, were they wrong!).  While this article makes that point today (3 years too late), I don’t expect anyone to remember it when the Arctic has another bad summer.  2013 was a good Arctic summer: cooler than recent years – and guess what? Arctic ice responded by … growing – you know, what it’s supposed to do according to physics.  Headslap.

To truly grasp what we’re doing to the planet, you need to understand this gigantic measurement”  This is an article about “giga”: what the prefix means and how people should know about it.  I disagree with it from the perspective that the explanations don’t utilize anything truly useful.  For example: a gigaton is “more than 6 million blue whales”.  Who knows how much a big whale weighs?  Can you envision 6 million of them?  The basic problem with giga is it is so big that it defies our everyday experiences.  The superficial problem is despite being written by someone who understands science, the article likely misses its intended audience and thus is not useful.

At the risk of delving too far into technical issues, this article is useful for me personally based on relevance to my geographic region’s upcoming winter weather: “Subtle Differences to Previous El Niños Key to Winter Forecast, And Why the PDO Matters“.  The PDO is the Pacific Decadal Oscillation – a low-frequency natural climate pattern that has direct and indirect influences on weather across at least the western half of the nation.  Many people in my professional community are aware that there is currently a strong El Nino in the equatorial Pacific.  I noted from recent write-ups that there are also warm sea surface temperature anomalies in the north Pacific (e.g., off the west coast of the U.S.) – in addition to the warm anomalies across the central and eastern equatorial Pacific (hallmarks of El Ninos).

The northern Pacific anomalies are an oddity and this article helps explain why they might be present.  In the late 1990s, the PDO likely entered into a cool pattern, which helps explain a couple of things.  First, El Ninos during the 2000s and 2010s had lower amplitude (cooler).  And second, global temperatures didn’t rise as quickly since 1998 as they did during the previous PDO phase (1977-1998).  This observation is also known as the global warming “hiatus” or “pause”.  A cool PDO means Pacific sea surface temperatures are cooler than average.  One effect of this is the Pacific absorbs heat from the atmosphere and keeps the atmosphere cooler than it otherwise would be.  The opposite is also true: warmer than average Pacific SSTs releases more heat to the atmosphere than is absorbed and the atmosphere warms more than average.

Which leads me to the next article: “Has the PDO Flipped to a Warming Phase?”  The PDO typically stays in a warm or cool regime for 10 to 30 years – hence the “multidecadal” characterization.  As I wrote above, the PDO moved into a cool phase in the late 1990s.  Recent positive temperature anomalies (since 2014) might indicate that the PDO is temporarily positive or it might indicate the PDO switched back to a positive or warm phase.  This has significant implications for global weather patterns until it switches back to its negative phase.  For example, I wrote above that there is currently a strong El Nino.  If the PDO switched to a positive phase, it could enhance any El Nino.  It would also do what I described above: release heat back into the atmosphere.  This means the global warming “hiatus” is, if the PDO switches, over.

Back to the Colorado forecast.  With a warmer north and equatorial Pacific (positive PDO and ENSO), what kind of winter can we expect?  The answer won’t surprise you: it’s hard to tell.  There are few similar historical examples that scientists can use to issue a reliable forecast.  They have to determine if warmer ocean temperatures persist and how the atmosphere’s jet stream responds.  Ridge and trough locations over the western US will ultimately determine when we get snow and how much snow we get during each storm.


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Commercialized Carbon Removal

The Guardian has an interesting article about startups working on capturing carbon dioxide from the air – a necessary technology if we are serious about any kind of climate goal with less CO2 than our business-as-usual pathway.  What are the companies doing and why is it important?  The article highlights three businesses: Carbon Engineering, Global Thermostat and Climeworks, which started in the 2000’s.  “All are aiming to make low-carbon fuels, used recycled CO2 and renewable energy to power the process.”  They’re making low-carbon fuels because small markets for them already exist.  Those markets will have to increase in size and scope for these startups to grow.

That’s one important aspect.  Another is the so-called “climate goal”.  As stated by international groups and increasing numbers of scientists, the climate goal is keeping CO2 concentrations below a certain threshold in order to keep global temperatures from increasing above 2C.  There is another international climate conference scheduled for later this year – the Conference of Parties in Paris, France (COP-21).  Leading up to that conference, countries are submitting carbon reduction goals that can be internationally monitored and verified.  Goals stated so far will definitely not meet the <2C goal – read about the UK’s goals here, for example, or here about the 45 countries who submitted plans already.  The reason is simple: we cannot deploy enough renewable energy generation or institute enough efficiency measures or change fuel types fast enough that will translate into halving global CO2 emissions within 10 years and going net negative by 2050.

What these companies are doing is directly related to that last goal: net negative CO2 emissions.  It won’t happen by 2050 or any other year unless we push serious money into research, development, and deployment.  It will take the private and public sectors working together for decades for utility-scale CO2 withdrawal from fuel burning and the free atmosphere.  These companies, and others, are the forefront of that industry.  But they need capital – a lot of it.  Cashflow at this juncture of their existence is crucial for them to exist long enough to deploy their technologies and evolve them as they run in the real world.  Anyone have a spare million or so dollars sitting around?


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U.S. Energy Information Administration: Reference Projection

EIA released its 2015 reference case for electricity generation between 2000 and 2040.  The upshot: while they expect natural gas and renewables to continue their growth in the U.S.’s overall energy portfolio, coal is still very much in the mix in 2040.  From a climate perspective, if their reference projection becomes reality, we easily pass 2C warming by 2100.

Their reference projection “reflects current laws and regulations—but not pending rules, such as the Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan“.  So it is no surprise that current laws and regulations result in passing the 2C threshold (or the GHG emissions which would actually lead to passing the 2C threshold).  The EPA’s Clean Power Plan isn’t in effect yet – and it will take time to analyze changes to actual generation once its final form does take effect.

 photo EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2015 Fig 1_zpsuiinhtg0.png

Figure 1. EIA’s Reference Case analysis and projection of U.S. electricity generation (2000-2040).

The good news is renewables’ share grows during the next 25 years.  Again, there’s no surprise there.  Nor is it surprising to see natural gas’ share also grow.  If you look at the left y-axis, the absolute share of renewables exceeds that of natural gas.  The bad news (from a 20th-century climate perspective) is that coal remains 34% of the electricity generation in this scenario.  That news is tempered by the fact that in both absolute and percentage terms, coal use is lower during the next 25 years than the last 15 years.  The absolute numbers are most frustrating from a climate perspective.  In 2040, this scenario projects >1.5 trillion kilowatt hours of coal generation.  Absent additional policy measures, that value remains largely unchanged during the next 25 years.  How do we address that?  Well, beating people over the head with scientific consensus claims hasn’t worked (and won’t in the future either): the American public know what causes global warming, once you get past self-identity question framing.  Once you interact with Americans on familiar terms, they’re much more willing to support global warming-related policies than many climate activists want you to believe.

 photo EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2015 Fig 2_zpsxotnkmbd.png

Figure 2. EIA’s renewable generation by type.

The EIA projects wind penetration to continue as it has for the last decade – almost doubling in absolute terms in the next 25 years.  We need that deployment and more to make a serious dent in GHG emissions.

 photo EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2015 Fig 3_zpsvigp121n.png

Figure 3. EIA’s six cases in their 2015 annual report.

You can see how different assumptions impacts EIA’s 2040 projections of electricity generation in 2040 compared to the 2013 historical case.  Don’t hope for high oil prices: renewables constitute more than 1 trillion kilowatt hours in that case, but coal also grows to nearly 2 trillion kWh!  Putting dreams aside, I don’t think those coal plants will all be running highly efficient carbon capture and sequestration technologies.

We still need RD&D for multiple technologies.  To do that, we need policies that prioritize innovative – and yes, risky – programs and projects.  The government is the only institution that can reliably assume that level of risk.  If we want to avoid 4C or 6C, we can; we need innovative policies and technologies today to stay below those thresholds.


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2 °C Warming Goal: Zombie Myths Continues

Fresh on the heels of my last post on whether 2 °C should be the exclusive threshold in international diplomacy negotiations, a link to a Grist article written yesterday caught my eye: “What you need to know about the next big climate report“.  What did I find in the 4th paragraph but this appeal to scientific expertise (emphasis mine):

The panel intends for this assessment report to guide international negotiators as they work, in the run-up to the big Paris climate summit in December 2015, to hammer out an agreement to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions. The U.N. hopes nations will find a way to squeeze through the ever-shrinking window of opportunity and cut a deal to keep the planet from exceeding 2 degrees Celsius of warming — the goal scientists have set to avoid the worst impacts of climate change — before we blow right past that target.

It is worth reminding yourself that everything you encounter in any media is biased somehow.  We’re all human and we all have our own biases.  Nothing is unbiased or objective because the act of putting words to concepts is derived from brains with preferred neural pathways.  There is nothing inherently bad with the bolded language above.  It comes from Grist, which many in the climate activist community view as a legitimate source of information (unlike say, Fox News).  However, the 2 °C threshold was not originally scientific.  That was one of the fundamental take home messages of my last post.

Negotiators in the early 1990s for the IPCC asked for some type of threshold that they might use in negotiations because, not being scientists, they didn’t know what threshold might be useful or appropriate.  A German scientist offered up the 2 °C threshold as part of the UNFCCC process and because nobody else came up with a different threshold or challenged the temperature threshold, negotiators moved it through their process until politicians from countries around the world agreed to insert the language in a formal report.  As is usually the case with these type of things, it has remained as the public threshold ever since.  Climate scientists started using the threshold as part of their work in an attempt to maintain legitimacy in the funding process because politicians control research purse strings.  Finally, as I wrote in my last post, the status quo is very hard to change.  Witness the personalized (not science-based!) attacks on the authors of the Nature Comment that initiated the most recent version of the threshold discussion.

The language Grist uses plays into skeptics hands.  “The goal scientists have set.”  That implies that scientists have political power and have already exercised it at the expense of every other person.  Unsurprisingly, most people aren’t fans of yielding power without a chance at involvement.  Hence one very good reason to subvert those scientists.  Grist is helping perpetrate the meme that there is a conspiracy against non-scientists – a meme that many climate scientist activists further inflame when they claim exclusive providence over anything climate related.  If activists don’t view someone as a perfect example of their tribe, they attack the “other” without hesitation because they’re using the climate issue as a proxy for arguments they should have instead.

Politicians and diplomats set the 2 °C threshold.  They were the only ones that had the power to do so.  Scientists don’t approve the IPCC’s language.  They write their own papers and contribute to the IPCC process, but politicians are responsible for approving every last word in IPCC reports.  Grist writers and editors should know this.  They’re all too willing to allow zombie myths to keep roaming the discussion space, it appears.


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What About That 2 °C Warming Goal?

David G. Victor and Charles F. Kennel, who are researchers in International Relations and Oceanography, respectively, wrote a Comment article for Nature at the beginning of October.  In it, they argued that climate and policy folks should stop using 2 °C as the exclusive goal in international climate policy discussions.  I agree with them on principle, but after reading their paper and numerous rebuttals to it, I also agree with their reasoning.

I’ll start with what they actually said because surprise, surprise, tribal and proxy arguments against their commentary focused on very narrow interpretations.

Bold simplicity must now face reality. Politically and scientifically, the 2 °C goal is wrong-headed. Politically, it has allowed some governments to pretend that they are taking serious action to mitigate global warming, when in reality they have achieved almost nothing. Scientifically, there are better ways to measure the stress that humans are placing on the climate system than the growth of average global surface temperature — which has stalled since 1998 and is poorly coupled to entities that governments and companies can control directly.

I agree with their political analysis.  What have governments – including the US – done to achieve the 2 °C goal?  Germany for instance largely switched to biomass to reduce GHG emissions while claiming that renewables (read: solar and wind) are replacing fossil fuels.  The US established more robust vehicle emissions and efficiency requirements, but the majority of US emission reductions in recent years result from cheap natural gas and the Great Recession.  No country will meet its Kyoto Protocol emissions goal – hence the hand-wringing in advance of the Paris 2015 climate conference.  And by the way, even if countries were meeting Kyoto goals, the goals would not lead to < 2 °C warming.

More from the authors:

There was little scientific basis for the 2 °C figure that was adopted, but it offered a simple focal point and was familiar from earlier discussions, including those by the IPCC, EU and Group of 8 (G8) industrial countries. At the time, the 2 °C goal sounded bold and perhaps feasible.

To be sure, models show that it is just possible to make deep planet-wide cuts in emissions to meet the goal. But those simulations make heroic assumptions — such as almost immediate global cooperation and widespread availability of technologies such as bioenergy carbon capture and storage methods that do not exist even in scale demonstration.

We will not achieve either of the last two requirements.  So we will very likely not achieve <2 °C warming, a politically, not scientifically, established goal.

A single index of climate-change risk would be wonderful. Such a thing, however, cannot exist. Instead, a set of indicators is needed to gauge the varied stresses that humans are placing on the climate system and their possible impacts. Doctors call their basket of health indices vital signs. The same approach is needed for the climate.

Policy-makers should also track ocean heat content and high-latitude temperature. […]

What is ultimately needed is a volatility index that measures the evolving risk from extreme events — so that global vital signs can be coupled to local information on what people care most about. A good start would be to track the total area during the year in which conditions stray by three standard deviations from the local and seasonal mean.

So the authors propose tracking a set of indicators including GHG concentrations, ocean heat content, and high-latitude temperature.  What is most needed? An index that measures evolving risk from extreme events.  That’s pretty cut and dry reading to me.

Of course, climate scientist activists took umbrage that somebody left their tribe and tried to argue for something other than a political goal that they didn’t have any input on that, by the way, we won’t meet anyway.

RealClimate (RC) starts by attacking the authors personally for not describing why the recent surface global warming pause isn’t really a pause – which is a tangential discussion.  RC also writes that “the best estimate of the annual cost of limiting warming to 2 °C is 0.06 % of global GDP”.  Really?  The “best” according to whom and under what set of assumptions?  These aren’t details RC shares, of course.  Cost estimates are increasing in number and accuracy, but this claim also misses the fundamental point the authors made: “technologies such as bioenergy carbon capture and storage methods that do not exist even in scale demonstration”.  RC confuses theoretical calculations of economic cost with the real-world deployment of new technologies.   To achieve the 2 °C goal requires net removal of CO2 from the atmosphere.  That means we need to deploy technologies that can remove more CO2 than the entire globe emits every year.  Those technologies do not exist today.  Period.  IF they were available, they would cost a fraction of global annual GDP.  It’s the IF in that sentence that too many critics willfully ignore.

RC then takes the predictable step toward a more stringent goal: 1.5 °C.  Wow.  Please see the previous paragraph to realize why this won’t happen.

RC also dismisses the authors’ claim that the 2 °C guardrail was “uncritically adopted”.  RC counters this wildness by claiming a group came up with the goal in 1995 before being adopted by Germany and the EU in 2005 and the IPCC in 2009.  Um, what critical arguments happened in between those dates?  RC provides no evidence for its own claim.  Was the threshold debated?  If so, when, where, and how?  What happened during the debates?  What were the alternative thresholds and why were they not accepted?  What was it about the 2 °C threshold that other thresholds could not or did not achieve in debates?  We know it wasn’t the technological and political features that demanded we choose 2 °C.  Diplomats and politicians don’t know the scientific details between IPCC emission scenarios or why 2 °C is noteworthy other than a couple of generic statements that a couple of climate-related feedbacks might start near 2 °C.  Absent that scientific expertise, politicians were happy to accept a number from the scientific community and 2 °C was one of the few numbers available to use.  Once chosen, other goals have to pass a higher hurdle than the status quo choice, which faced no similar scrutiny.

RC then rebuts the authors’ proposed long-term goal for a robust extreme events index, claiming that such an index would be more volatile than global temperature.  The basis for such an index, like any, is its utility.  People don’t pay much attention to annual global temperatures because it’s a remote metric.  Who experienced an annual mean global temperature?  Nobody.  We all experienced local temperature variability and psychological research details how those experiences feed directly into a person’s perception of the threat of climate change.  Nothing will change those psychological effects.  So the proposed index, at least in my mind, seeks to leverage them instead of dismissing them.  Will people in Miami experience different climate-related threats at a different magnitude than mid-Westerners or Pacific Islanders?  Of course they will.  2 °C is insufficient because the effects of that threshold will impact different areas differently.  It’s about a useful a threshold as the poverty level or median wage.  Those levels mean very different things in rural areas compared to urban areas due to a long list of factors.  That’s where scientific research can step in and actually help develop a robust index, something that RC dismissed at first read – a very uncritical, knee-jerk response.

Also unsurprisingly, ClimateProgress (CP) immediately attacks the authors’ legitimacy.  It’s telling that the same people who decry such tactics from the right-wing so often employ them in their own discourse with people who are trying to achieve similar goals.  CP also spends time hand waving about theoretical economic analyses while ignoring the basic simple real-world fact that technologies don’t exist today that do what the IPCC assumes they will do starting tomorrow on a global scale.  It’s an inherent and incorrect assumption which invalidates any results based on it.  I can cite lots of theoretical economic analyses in any number of discussions, but the theory has to be implemented in the real world to have any practical meaning.  I want carbon capture technologies deployed globally tomorrow too because I know how risky climate change is.  Wishing doesn’t make it so.  It’s why I’ve been critical of the Obama administration for putting all of their political capital into a plan to drive millions of US consumers into for-profit insurance markets instead of addressing the multitude of problems facing the country, including the desperate need to perform research and development on technologies to help alleviate future climate change.

The authors responded to RC and CP in a DotEarth piece.  I agree with this statement:

The reality is that MOST of the debate about goals should centrally involve the social sciences—more on that below.

What I find interesting about this statement is that if we were to follow RC’s and CP’s heavy-handed criticism, they shouldn’t have a seat at the climate goal-setting table because they don’t have the requisite expertise to participate.  What social science credibility do physical scientists have?  Too many activists like those at RC and CP don’t want anyone else to have a seat at the table, but have they staked out a legitimate claim why they get one while nobody else does?  They continue a little later on:

This is where a little bit of political science is helpful. I can’t think of any complex regulatory function that is performed according to single indicators. Central bankers don’t behave this way when they set (unilaterally and in coordination) interest rates and make other interventions in the economy. Trade policy isn’t organized this way. In our article we use the example of the Millennium Development Goals because that example is perhaps closest to what the UN-oriented policy communities know—again, multiple goals, many indicators. That’s exactly what’s needed on climate.

They also note that different perspectives leads to different types of goals – which directly contradicts the climate community’s acceptance of 2 °C as the only goal to pursue.  They push back against their critics’ denouncement for not including enough about how people set the 2 °C threshold:

The reason it is important to get this story right is not so that the right community gets “credit” for focusing on 2 degrees but so that we can understand how the scientific community has allowed itself to get lulled into thinking that it is contributing to serious goal-setting when, in fact, we have actually not done our jobs properly.

They identify what I think is the real critical issue which people bury with the proxy battles I present above:

That means that for nearly everyone, the question of goals is deeply intertwined with ultimate impacts, adaptability and costs.  Very quickly we can see that matter of goal-setting isn’t some abstract number that is a guardrail but it is bound up in our assessments of risk and of willingness to pay for abatement as well as bear risk.

The point here is perhaps most salient: the 2 °C threshold is but one value in a very large set.  Different people have different goals for different reasons – based on their value system.  As well they should.  The 2 °C threshold is treated as a sacred cow by too many in the climate community.  What happens when, as I now believe will happen, the globe warms more than 2 °C?  Will folks finally stop cherry picking statistics and brow-beating other folks who are really their allies in this effort?  Will folks set aside tribalism and accept expertise from other researchers, you know, acceptance of other sciences?

There are many more pieces written about this Nature Comment that I didn’t get into here.  They all serve as interesting exhibits in the ongoing effort to get our heads around the wicked problem of climate change and design efficient policies to change our emissions habits.  This unfortunately won’t be the final example of such exhibits.


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Climate mitigation and adaptation

Twitter and the blogosphere are aflutter with references to David Robert’s post, “Preventing climate change and adapting to it are not morally equivalent“.  I read the post with the mindset that David was trying to continue recent climate-related public themes.  With that in mind, I wanted to respond to some points.

Climate hawks are familiar with the framing of climate policy credited to White House science advisor John Holdren, to wit: We will respond to climate change with some mix of mitigation, adaptation, and suffering; all that remains to be determined is the mix. […] It makes them sound fungible, as though a unit of either can be traded in for an equivalent unit of suffering. That’s misleading. They are very different, not only on a practical level but morally.

I’ll start by noting my disagreement that Holdren’s framing establishes equitable fungibility.  That’s not the way I interpret it, anyway.  For me, it boils down to this: we have a finite amount of resources to devote to climate action.  What we spend them on remains undecided.  I don’t think of one unit of mitigation equaling one unit of adaptation.  Such a frame strikes me as silly, to be quite frank.  Many factors will go into deciding where to spend resources.  I think local and state US governments are choosing adaptation because they’ve correctly assessed that mitigation is costlier.  Governments have responsibilities to their constituencies – not far-off populations that are admittedly more at risk from climate change than ours.  That’s one of the Big Pillar Problems: climate change effects impact people with little responsibility to the problem disproportionately.  It is psychologically sound to muster less action for “others” than “selves” – for better or worse, altruism isn’t rewarded in our society.  Unfortunately, that’s the reality we live and operate in.  Wishes aren’t going to change that.

Communities and organizations could break up resources to mitigate potential dirty energy projects and make them clean in foreign countries where it is relatively cheaper to do so while simultaneously allocating remaining resources to address perceived threats locally.  That’s a harder thing to do than what I describe above – only adapt locally – but it’s also cheaper than mitigating locally (for now).

Say I pay $10 to reduce carbon by a ton. I bear the full cost, but because all of humanity benefits, I receive only one seven-billionth of the value of my investment (give or take).

David contradicts what he said prior to this with this statement.  The poorest and most vulnerable benefit more than he does.  But note the fundamental, critical point here: can anyone benefit by $10/7,000,000,000?  What can I do with 1.43*10^-9 dollars?  Absolutely nothing.  And neither can the primary benefitees, who have to share most of that calculable but meaningless number.  The second point which follows quickly on the heels of the first is that any mitigation investment requires multiple billions before anyone sees one dollar’s value and multiple trillions before anyone sees something meaningful.  Where does that money come from and how do we convince people to make the required investment with the aforementioned psychological barriers to doing so?

One obvious implication of this difference is that, to the extent spending favors adaptation over mitigation, it will replicate and reinforce existing inequalities of wealth and power. The benefits will accrue to those with the money to pay for them.

I’ll look at this differently to help understand it better: will additional mitigation spending reduce wealth and power inequalities?  Is David arguing that developing countries will be equally wealthy and powerful if climate spending is directed towards mitigation and not adaptation?  That’s probably a logical extreme.  Will we reduce inequalities between developing and developed countries to a greater extent due to mitigation or adaptation is one potential question we can address.  I haven’t seen anything that convinces me of one argument or the other.  I haven’t seen anything that addresses quantitatively either argument, to be frank.

It becomes more expensive to mitigate to an arbitrarily chosen threshold if the date by which to do so remains unchanged.  That is, if you accept <2C warming by 2100 as a goal (though I’ve detailed many times why such a goal is unfeasible), then mitigation costs are lower if we begin mitigation today instead of 20 years from now.  But why do we accept unnecessary firm boundaries on the problem?  If, as I’ve postulated, <2C warming by 2100 isn’t technologically or politically feasible, then one or both boundaries must change.  The further out in time we set the goal, the likelier it is that technologies will exist to more cheaply attain the goal.  The higher the temperature goal is, the likelier we are to achieve it.  And just like in the rest of our lives, the easier the goal is to attain, the likelier we are to do so.  And once done, the easier it becomes to attain subsequent along-the-road goals.

What’s left out of these goals is developed nation-level energy generation in developing nations – in other words keeping poor people poor indefinitely.  Mitigation alone won’t reduce wealth inequality.  If David wants to reduce wealth inequality, the best way to do so is to post-industrialize developing nations as quickly as possible.  With reduced inequality comes increased power.  The side benefits?  Developed nations actually work on mitigation (again, saving costs by mitigating where it’s cheaper) they can concentrate on adapting to climate effects along the way.

I recognize David’s valid point that skeptics are likely to latch onto the “we need to adapt” frame as a way to continue avoiding “we need to mitigate” concept.  But skeptics are going to continue avoiding the problem so long as we don’t switch how we talk with them.


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Language surrounding ozone depletion

As a physical scientist who has also studied social aspects of science and technology, language – specifically word choice – is important.  That is why when “ozone hole healing” jumped out from my Twitter feed today, it disappointed me.  Why?

Is the ozone layer alive?  Is it currently wounded?  Can it heal?

I know environmental activists like to use the frame of Earth as a living thing.  It’s not.  It is a celestial body with multiple interacting physical systems.  The Earth neither grows nor reproduces within its environment.  There are things that are alive (obviously) on Earth.  Phenomena occur within Earth systems, but that doesn’t qualify as life.  Thus it cannot heal because it is not diseased or injured.

There is ozone depletion in the stratosphere that is exclusively caused by on life form on the planet – people.  In news today, ozone depletion has for the first time since being discovered in the 1980s slowed and even reversed.  That is very good news, as ozone depletion impacted some of Earth’s physical systems as well as actual life on the planet.

Metaphors are powerful tools in our language.  We must take care to use them appropriately.  There is nothing wrong with using scientific language to describe scientific processes.  We can make explanations as simple as necessary, which should promote wider understanding of complex phenomena.

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