I wrote about some carbon market-related items I ran across last month. While I haven’t had time yet to read the RGGI report that Jason Brown linked to (research and family duties leaves very little time for anything else), I have read additional items since that post that I want to collect here for when I do have more time. Let me state at the outset that I think carbon markets are one piece of a large puzzle. From what I’ve read to date, I get the impression that most carbon markets are not set up in such a way (yet) that actually addresses what I think they’re supposed to address: a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, especially CO2. Part of the reason for this is the way the groups set up and managed markets. This results from lack of appropriate policy that demands of and allows for organizations to set up and run an efficient market. To close this introduction, I will observe again that most economists recommend a carbon tax if the true intent of a policy is to reduce emissions. I was surprised to learn this since I don’t think most economists are bleeding-heart liberals; nor do I think they are part of the vast conspiracy to establish a one-world government that controls every aspect of our lives. They base their recommendation on fundamental economic principles – a scary thought in today’s reactionary world, I know.
First, some news: “The European Parliament this week voted 334-315 (with 60 abstentions) against a controversial “back-loading” plan that aimed to boost the flagging price of carbon, which since 2008 has fallen from about 31 euros per tonne to about 4 euros (about $5.20). Since the vote, the price has fallen even farther, to 2.80 euros.”
What does “back-loading” mean? Back-loading would have taken some allowances out of the European market for two years. Without as many allowances, the price of carbon likely would have increased. How over-allocated is the market? “The surplus is 1.5 billion-2 billion tonnes, or about a year’s emissions.“ There are varying opinions as to what the appropriate price should be to achieve behavioral change. Back-loading might have increased the price to ~10 euros (1/3 its original price, which many people think is the minimum necessary). As I wrote last year, one fundamental problem with the European market was the number of allowances was far too high. But even if the price was “right”, would carbon markets work? Probably not right away. Another problem with them is intense lobbying by fossil fuel entities (to weaken the efficacy of the market; they abandon calls for “free market” support when it comes to carbon taxes/markets) as well as the corruption and non-transparency in the market.
The California cap-and-trade scheme establishes a floor and a ceiling for price, which might alleviate some of the problems the Euro ETS has. The European scheme, by keeping carbon prices so low, sends the wrong signal. Thus, power utilities are switching from natural gas to coal, despite the fact that burning coal releases twice as much carbon per unit of energy produced. In that sense, the US energy market is acting correctly when falling natural gas prices encourage utilities to switch from coal to natural gas. The European’s situation leads to an interesting dilemma. They have admonished the US for decades on lack of climate action. Yet Europe did not achieve the first round of Kyoto Protocol-inspired emissions targets and if they continue the switch from cleaner fuels to dirtier fuels, they will not hit the next round they set for themselves either.
Steffen Böhm’s Guardian article ends with this:
None of these will provide a one-fits-all solution. But we cannot afford to lose another 15 years in our quest to rapidly decarbonise our economies, businesses and societies. Carbon markets have given the appearance of us doing something about climate change, while actually legitimising the constant rise of emissions. We need to go back to the drawing board and come up with solutions that actually work in practice.
One solution could be the implementation of new cap-and-trade schemes in other countries, as this CleanTechnica article discusses. If other planners examine the European scheme and make efforts to correct as many mistakes as possible, then include mechanisms to trade with other schemes around the world, the Europeans may not abandon their market. That would also give the Europeans time to see what solutions are implemented around the world and eventually include them in their own program. The Chinese, as is other energy-climate topics, are very important in this regard, not only because they are currently the largest global emitters. The Chinese government can put programs in place that are not subject to the same kind of political pressures present in the US or Europe.
The US is also very important for the future of markets, emissions, and concentrations. The US of course currently does not have a cap-and-trade scheme, thanks to the outsized political influence fossil fuel companies have. Small schemes exist or are coming on-line however. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) has been in operation across the Northeast US for six years and has a mechanism to reduce allocations, which was beneficial with the recent coal-to-gas switch. California’s system came online within the last year. Given the size of the California economy, if this market is more successful than the European market, we can expect additional good news and participation. If gruops connect existing these markets, and new ones, the prospect for emissions reductions is better than it looks today. As Böhm wrote, the time for half-measures is long gone. The world needs smart, aggressive action to avoid the worst global change effects at the end of the century. Carbon markets are likely a part of the solution, so long as they’re planned and managed well.
