NASA & NOAA: March 2013 9th, 10th Warmest Globally On Record

According to data released by NOAA, March was the 10th warmest globally on record.  Here are the NOAA data and report.  NASA also released their suite of graphics, but their surface temperature data page is down today, so I cannot relay how NASA’s March temperature compares to historical Marches.  Once their site is back up, I will update this post.  [Update: NASA's analysis resulted in their 9th warmest March on record.  Here are the data for  NASA’s analysis.] The two agencies have slightly different analysis techniques, which in this case resulted in not only different temperature anomaly values but somewhat different rankings as well.  The two techniques provide a check on one another and confidence for us.

The details:

March’s global average temperatures were 0.59°C (1.062°F) above normal (1951-1980), according to NASA, as the following graphic shows.  The past three months have a +0.57°C temperature anomaly.  And the latest 12-month period (Apr 2012 – Mar 2013) had a +0.60°C temperature anomaly.  The time series graph in the lower-right quadrant shows NASA’s 12-month running mean temperature index.  The recent downturn (2010-2012) was largely due to the latest La Niña event (see below for more) that ended early last summer.  Since then, ENSO conditions returned to a neutral state (neither La Niña nor El Niñ0).  Therefore, as previous anomalously cool months fall off the back of the running mean, and barring another La Niña, the 12-month temperature trace should track upward again throughout 2013.

Figure 1. Global mean surface temperature anomaly maps and 12-month running mean time series through March 2013 from NASA.

According to NOAA, March’s global average temperatures were 0.58°C (1.044°F) above the 20th century mean of 12.7°C (54.9°F).  NOAA’s global temperature anomaly map for March (duplicated below) shows where conditions were warmer than average during the month.

Figure 2. Global temperature anomaly map for March 2013 from NOAA.

The two different analyses’ importance is also shown by the preceding two figures.  Despite small differences in specific global temperature anomalies, both analyses picked up on the same temperature patterns and their relative strength.

The very warm conditions found over Greenland are a concern.  Greenland was warmer than average during more months in recent history than not.  In contrast to 2012, northern Eurasian temperatures were much cooler than normal.  This is likely a temporary, seasonal effect.  Long-term temperatures over much of this region continue to rise at among the fastest rate for any region on Earth.

The NASA and NOAA surface temperature maps correlate well with the 500-mb height pressure anomalies, as seen in this graph:

Figure 3. 500-mb heights (white contours) and anomalies (m; color contours) during March 2013.

Note the correspondence between the height map and the NASA & NOAA surface temperature maps: lower heights (negative height anomalies) present over the North Atlantic and northern Eurasia overlay the cold surface temperature anomalies at the surface.  Similarly, warm surface temperature anomalies are located under the positive 500-mb height anomalies.

These temperature observations are of interest for the following reason: the globe came out of a moderate La Niña event in the first half of last year.  During the second half of the 2012 and the first part of 2013, we remained in a ENSO-neutral state (neither El Niño nor La Niña):

Figure 4. Time series of weekly SST data from NCEP (NOAA).  The highest interest region for El Niño/La Niña is NINO 3.4 (2nd time series from top).

The last La Niña event hit its highest (most negative) magnitude more than once between November 2011 and February 2012.  Since then, tropical Pacific sea-surface temperatures peaked at +0.8 (y-axis) in September 2012.  You can see the effect on global temperatures that the last La Niña had via this NASA time series.  Both the sea surface temperature and land surface temperature time series decreased from 2010 (when the globe reached record warmth) to 2012.  So a natural, low-frequency climate oscillation affected the globe’s temperatures during the past couple of years.  Underlying that oscillation is the background warming caused by humans.  And yet temperatures were still in the top-10 warmest for a calendar year (2012) and individual months, including March 2013, in recorded history.

Skeptics have pointed out that warming has “stopped” in recent years (by comparing recent temperatures to the 1998 maximum which was heavily influenced by a strong El Niño even), which they hope will introduce confusion to the public on this topic.  What is likely going on is quite different: a global annual energy imbalance exists (less outgoing energy than incoming energy).  If the surface temperature rise has seemingly stalled, the excess energy is going somewhere.  That somewhere is likely the oceans, and specifically the deep ocean (see the figures below).  Before we all cheer about this (since few people want surface temperatures to continue to rise quickly), consider the implications.  If you add heat to a material, it expands.  The ocean is no different; sea-levels are rising in part because of heat added to it in the past.  The heat that has entered in recent years won’t manifest as sea-level rise for some time, but it will happen.  Moreover, when the heated ocean comes back up to the surface, that heat will then be released to the atmosphere, which will raise surface temperatures as well as introduce additional water vapor.  Thus, the short-term warming rate might have slowed down, but we have locked in future warming (higher future warming rate) as well as future climate effects.

Figure 5. Total global heat content anomaly from 1950-2004. An overwhelming majority of energy went to the global oceans.

Figure 6. New research that shows anomalous ocean heat energy location since the late 1950s.  The purple lines in the graph show how the heat content of the whole ocean has changed over the past five decades. The blue lines represent only the top 700 m and the grey lines are just the top 300 m.  Source: Balmaseda et al., (2013)

Balmaseda et al.’s work demonstrates the transport of anomalous energy through the depth of the global oceans.  Note that the grey lines’ lack of significant change from 2004-2008 (upper 300m).  Observations of surface temperature include the very top part of this 300m layer.  Since the layer hasn’t changed much, neither have surface temperature readings.  Note the rapid increase in heat content within the top 700m.  Given the lack of increase in the top 300m, the 300-700m layer heat content must have increased.  By the same logic, the rapid growth in heat content throughout the depth of the ocean, which did not stall post-2004, provides evidence for anomalous heat location.  You can also see the impact of major volcanic eruptions on ocean heat content: less incoming solar radiation means less absorbed heat.

A significant question for climate scientists is this: are climate models capable of picking up this heat anomaly signal and do they show a similar trend?  If they aren’t, then their projections of surface temperature change is likely to be incorrect since the heat is warming the abyssal ocean and not the land and atmosphere in the 2000s and 2010s.  If they aren’t, climate policy is also impacted.  Instead of warmer surface temperatures (and effects on drought, agriculture, and health to name just a few), anomalous ocean heat content will impact coastal communities more than previously thought.  Consider the implications of that in addition to the AR4′s lack of consideration of land-based ice melt: sea level projections could be too conservative.

That said, it is also a fair question to ask whether today’s climate policies are sufficient for today’s climate.  In many cases, I would say  they aren’t sufficient.  Paying for recovery from seemingly localized severe weather and climate events is and always will be more expensive than paying to increase resilience from those events.  As drought continues to impact US agriculture, as Arctic ice continues to melt to new record lows, as storms come ashore and impacts communities that are not prepared for today’s high-risk events (due mostly to poor zoning and destruction of natural protections), economic costs will accumulate in this and in future decades.  It is up to us how many costs we subject ourselves to.

As President Obama began his second term with climate change “a priority”, he tosses aside the most effective tool available and most recommended by economists: a carbon tax.  Every other policy tool will be less effective than a Pigouvian tax at minimizing the actions that cause future economic harm.  It is up to the citizens of this country, and others, to take the lead on this topic.  We have to demand common sense actions that will actually make a difference.  But be forewarned: even if we take action today, we will still see more warmest La Niña years, more warmest El Niño years, more drought, higher sea levels, increased ocean acidification, more plant stress, and more ecosystem stress.  The biggest difference between efforts in the 1980s and 1990s to scrub sulfur and CFC emissions and future efforts to reduce CO2 emissions is this: the first two yielded an almost immediate result while it will take decades before CO2 emission reductions produce tangible results humans can see.

Recent Carbon Market News – April 2013

I wrote about some carbon market-related items I ran across last month. While I haven’t had time yet to read the RGGI report that Jason Brown linked to (research and family duties leaves very little time for anything else), I have read additional items since that post that I want to collect here for when I do have more time.  Let me state at the outset that I think carbon markets are one piece of a large puzzle.  From what I’ve read to date, I get the impression that most carbon markets are not set up in such a way (yet) that actually addresses what I think they’re supposed to address: a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, especially CO2.  Part of the reason for this is the way the groups set up and managed markets.  This results from lack of appropriate policy that demands of and allows for organizations to set up and run an efficient market.  To close this introduction, I will observe again that most economists recommend a carbon tax if the true intent of a policy is to reduce emissions.  I was surprised to learn this since I don’t think most economists are bleeding-heart liberals; nor do I think they are part of the vast conspiracy to establish a one-world government that controls every aspect of our lives.  They base their recommendation on fundamental economic principles – a scary thought in today’s reactionary world, I know.

First, some news: “The European Parliament this week voted 334-315 (with 60 abstentions) against a controversial “back-loading” plan that aimed to boost the flagging price of carbon, which since 2008 has fallen from about 31 euros per tonne to about 4 euros (about $5.20). Since the vote, the price has fallen even farther, to 2.80 euros.”

What does “back-loading” mean?  Back-loading would have taken some allowances out of the European market for two years.  Without as many allowances, the price of carbon likely would have increased. How over-allocated is the market?  “The surplus is 1.5 billion-2 billion tonnes, or about a year’s emissions.“  There are varying opinions as to what the appropriate price should be to achieve behavioral change.  Back-loading might have increased the price to ~10 euros (1/3 its original price, which many people think is the minimum necessary).  As I wrote last year, one fundamental problem with the European market was the number of allowances was far too high.  But even if the price was “right”, would carbon markets work?  Probably not right away.  Another problem with them is intense lobbying by fossil fuel entities (to weaken the efficacy of the market; they abandon calls for “free market” support when it comes to carbon taxes/markets) as well as the corruption and non-transparency in the market.

The California cap-and-trade scheme establishes a floor and a ceiling for price, which might alleviate some of the problems the Euro ETS has.  The European scheme, by keeping carbon prices so low, sends the wrong signal.  Thus, power utilities are switching from natural gas to coal, despite the fact that burning coal releases twice as much carbon per unit of energy produced.  In that sense, the US energy market is acting correctly when falling natural gas prices encourage utilities to switch from coal to natural gas.  The European’s situation leads to an interesting dilemma.  They have admonished the US for decades on lack of climate action.  Yet Europe did not achieve the first round of Kyoto Protocol-inspired emissions targets and if they continue the switch from cleaner fuels to dirtier fuels, they will not hit the next round they set for themselves either.

Steffen Böhm’s Guardian article ends with this:

None of these will provide a one-fits-all solution. But we cannot afford to lose another 15 years in our quest to rapidly decarbonise our economies, businesses and societies. Carbon markets have given the appearance of us doing something about climate change, while actually legitimising the constant rise of emissions. We need to go back to the drawing board and come up with solutions that actually work in practice.

One solution could be the implementation of new cap-and-trade schemes in other countries, as this CleanTechnica article discusses.  If other planners examine the European scheme and make efforts to correct as many mistakes as possible, then include mechanisms to trade with other schemes around the world, the Europeans may not abandon their market.  That would also give the Europeans time to see what solutions are implemented around the world and eventually include them in their own program.  The Chinese, as is other energy-climate topics, are very important in this regard, not only because they are currently the largest global emitters.  The Chinese government can put programs in place that are not subject to the same kind of political pressures present in the US or Europe.

The US is also very important for the future of markets, emissions, and concentrations.  The US of course currently does not have a cap-and-trade scheme, thanks to the outsized political influence fossil fuel companies have.  Small schemes exist or are coming on-line however.  The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) has been in operation across the Northeast US for six years and has a mechanism to reduce allocations, which was beneficial with the recent coal-to-gas switch.  California’s system came online within the last year.  Given the size of the California economy, if this market is more successful than the European market, we can expect additional good news and participation.  If gruops connect existing these markets, and new ones, the prospect for emissions reductions is better than it looks today.  As Böhm wrote, the time for half-measures is long gone.  The world needs smart, aggressive action to avoid the worst global change effects at the end of the century.  Carbon markets are likely a part of the solution, so long as they’re planned and managed well.

March 2013 CO2 Concentrations: 397.34 ppm

During March 2013, the Scripps Institution of Oceanography measured an average of 397.34ppm CO2 concentration at their Mauna Loa, Hawai’i’s Observatory.

This value is a big deal.  Why?  Because not only is 397.34 ppm the largest CO2 concentration value for any March in recorded history, it is the largest CO2 concentration value in any month in recorded history.  More on that below.  This year’s March value is 2.89 ppm higher than March 2012′s!  Most month-to-month differences are between 1 and 2 ppm.  This jump of 2.89 ppm is very high, but is ~0.5 ppm less than February’s year-over-year change of 3.37 ppm.  Of course, the unending trend toward higher concentrations with time, no matter the month or specific year-over-year value, as seen in the graphs below, is more significant.

Let’s get back to that all-time high concentration value.  The yearly maximum monthly value normally occurs during May. Last year was no different: the 396.78ppm concentration in May 2012 was the highest value reported last year and, prior to the last two months, in recorded history (neglecting proxy data).  We can expect April and May of this year to produce new record values.  I wrote the following two months ago:

If we extrapolate last year’s maximum value out in time, it will only be 2 years until Scripps reports 400ppm average concentration for a singular month (likely May 2014; I expect May 2013′s value will be ~398ppm).  Note that I previously wrote that this wouldn’t occur until 2015 – this means CO2 concentrations are another climate variable that is increasing faster than experts predicted just a short couple of years ago.

For the most part, I stand by that prediction.  But actual concentration increases might prove  me wrong.  Here is why: the difference in CO2 concentration values between May 2012 and March 2012 was 2.33 ppm (396.78 – 394.45).  If we do the simplest thing and add that same difference to this March’s value, we get 399.67 ppm.  That is awfully close to 400 ppm, but less than the 399.93 ppm extrapolation I performed last month.  I discussed May 2013′s projection with Sourabh after last month’s post.  They predicted 399.5-400 ppm concentration for May 2013.  I think NOAA will measure May 2013′s concentration near 399.3 ppm.  There are other calculations that we could do to come up with a range of predictions, but I unfortunately don’t have the time to do them right now.  I will have content myself with waiting until June to find out how fast concentrations rose through May.

I normally post CO2now.org’s chart of CO2 concentrations since 1958/59 for a given month.  They finally posted last month’s average concentration value yesterday, but have not updated their graph from February 2013 yet.  When they do, I will update this post.

[Update: here is their graphic for March 2013]

Figure 1 – Time series of CO2 concentrations measured at Scripp’s Mauna Loa Observatory in March from 1958 through 2013.

How do concentration measurements change in calendar years?  The following two graphs demonstrate this.

Figure 2 – Monthly CO2 concentration values from 2009 through 2013 (NOAA).  Note the yearly minimum observation is now in the past and we are two months removed from the yearly maximum value.  NOAA is likely to measure this year’s maximum value near 399ppm.

Figure 3 – 50 year time series of CO2 concentrations at Mauna Loa Observatory.  The red curve represents the seasonal cycle based on monthly average values.  The black curve represents the data with the seasonal cycle removed to show the long-term trend.  This graph shows the recent and ongoing increase in CO2 concentrations.  Remember that as a greenhouse gas, CO2 increases the radiative forcing of the Earth, which increases the amount of energy in our climate system.

In previous posts on this topic, I showed and discussed historical and projected concentrations at this part of the post.  I will skip this for now because there is something about this data that I think provides a different context of the same conversation.  I saw a graphic last month that I provides useful focus on this topic:

Figure 3 – CO2 concentration (top) and annual average growth rate (bottom). Source: Guardian

The top part of Figure 3 should look familiar – it’s the black line in Figure 3.  The bottom part is the annual change in CO2 concentrations.  If we fit a line to the data, the line would have a positive slope, which means annual changes are increasing with time.  So CO2 concentrations are increasing at an increasing rate – not a good trend with respect to minimizing future warming.  In the 1960s, concentrations increased at less than 1 ppm/year.  In the 2000s, concentrations increased at 2.07 ppm/year.  This isn’t surprising – CO2 emissions continue to increase decade after decade.  Natural systems are not equipped to remove CO2 emissions quickly from the atmosphere.  Indeed, natural systems will take tens of thousands of years to remove the CO2 we emitted in the course of a couple short centuries.  Human systems do not yet exist that remove CO2 from any medium (air or water).  They are not likely to exist for some time.  So NOAA will extend the right side of the above graphs for years and decades to come.

The greenhouse effect details how these increasing concentrations will affect future temperatures.  The more GHGs (CO2 and others) are in the atmosphere, all else equal, the more radiative forcing the GHGs cause.  More forcing means warmer temperatures as energy is re-radiated back toward the Earth’s surface.  Conditions higher in the atmosphere affects this relationship, which is what my volcano post addressed.  A number of medium-sized volcanoes injected SO2 into the stratosphere (which is above the troposphere – where we live and our weather occurs) in the last decade.  Those SO2 particles reflected incoming solar radiation.  So while we emitted more GHGs into the troposphere, less radiation entered the troposphere in the past 10 years than the previous 10 years.  With less incoming radiation, the GHGs re-emitted less energy toward the surface of the Earth.  This is likely part of the reason why the global temperature trend leveled off in the 2000s after its relatively rapid run-up in previous decades.

This situation is important for the following reason.  Once the SO2 falls out of the atmosphere, the additional incoming radiation will encounter higher GHG concentrations than was present in the late 1990s.  As a result, we will likely see a stronger surface temperature response sometime in the future than the response of the 1990s.

The rise in CO2 concentrations will slow down, stop, and reverse when we decide it will.  We can choose 350 ppm or 450 ppm or any other target.  That choice is dependent on the type of policies we decide to implement.  It is our current policy to burn fossil fuels because doing so is cheap, albeit inefficient.  We will widely deploy clean sources of energy when they are cheap, which we control.  We will remove CO2 from the atmosphere when we have cheap and effective technologies and mechanisms to do so, which we control.  Today’s carbon markets are not the correct mechanism, as they are aptly demonstrating.  We will limit future warming and downstream climate effects when we choose to do so.

No Significant Climate Change Signal In 2012 US Drought

A team of atmospheric scientists, led by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association, issued a report this week that presented initial results of an examination into the extreme 2012 US drought.  Its core finding was the drought likely resulted mostly from natural variability.  Any climate change signal is relatively small but likely made conditions across the Midwest US a little dryer and a little warmer than they otherwise would have been absent climate change.

The 2012 drought did not grow out of the 2010-2011 Southern drought that impacted Texas and Oklahoma, as many, including myself, theorized as the drought developed.  Instead, a stubborn ridge of high pressure took hold over the Plains, which cut off the vital Gulf of Mexico water supply upon which the region depends for agriculture.

This sentence, in the Executive Summary, is key: “The interpretation is of an event resulting largely from internal atmospheric variability having limited long lead predictability.”  Many people think severe weather events should be easy to forecast, but the opposite is true.  The rarer the event, the more difficult it is to accurately forecast with any kind of time difference.  Additionally, the connection to low-frequency climate oscillations (i.e., La Niña: “the 2012 drought occurred in concert with an appreciably warmer ocean in most basins than was the case for any prior historical drought”) were minimal in the 2012 drought, contrary to what I have theorized.  That’s the beauty of science, of course.  You can be incorrect about something and demonstrate as such when data are analyzed.

Recently, some folks have characterized this event as a “flash drought”, owing to the sudden onset of such an event, as the first graphic below shows.  The term obviously borrows from the better known “flash flood” concept.  Unlike a flood however, droughts have longer-term impacts on human and ecosystems.  Costs are still only estimated at this time (because the drought is ongoing) at $12 billion.  While significant, the 1980 drought event that caused 56 billion (2012$) and the 1988 drought that caused 78 billion (2012$) of damages eclipsed the 2012 event (so far).  The $12 billion figure is likely to grow as the drought impacts water supply reductions and livestock.  The 2012 crop yield deficit was the greatest since 1866.

Figure 1 – U.S. Drought Monitor maps showing the evolution of the 2012 “flash drought” across the US Great Plains.  Little evidence existed in November 2011 or even May 2012 that the drought would achieve the extent and intensity that it did.

The drought was the worst on record for WY, CO, NE, KS, MO, and IA, as the following graphic shows.  The region experienced a 53% rainfall deficit (39.3mm vs. 73.5mm) in 2012.  1934 held the previous record of -28.4mm deficit.  The 2012 deficit corresponds to a 2.7 standardized deficit, which approaches a 1-in-100 event.  This relates well to the precipitation time series in the graph below.

Figure 2 – Precipitation and temperature departures from normal for the six states impacted by the 2012 drought.  Note the extreme minimum in precipitation on the right side of the top graph.  2012 temperatures as a whole were not as extreme as those recorded twice during the 1930s, but July 2012 still ranks as the warmest month on record for the six states as well as the entire US.

The analysis also suggests that we should not expect similar 2013 precipitation anomalies on the basis of 2012 anomalies alone (based on the report’s Figures 10 and 11).  Put another way, just because 2012 was drier than normal, 2013 shouldn’t automatically be drier also.  Dry epochs occurred in this region before: in the 1930s and 1950s.  Subsequent dry years occurred then due to longer-term changes in natural variability as well as land use practices.  The currently is no indication that the 2010s will similarly be a dry epoch.  As with the 2012 drought, such a prediction remains beyond current skill.

The diagnosed linkage to low-frequency forcing is interesting.  Warm tropical sea-surface temperatures (SSTs) in the Indo-West Pacific Oceans and cold east Pacific conditions tend to dry the mid-latitudes in the winter/spring season and not the summer season.  As the first graphic demonstrates, the 2012 drought flashed in the summer and not the winter.  So despite primed conditions for drying in winter 2011-12, the Great Plains drought occurred for different reasons.

Of further interest to the future is the following graphs.  The researchers generated a 20-member NCAR CAM-4 ensemble with monthly varying SSTs, sea ice, and specified external radiative forcings consisting of greenhouse gases (e.g. CO2, CH4, NO2, O3, CFCs), aerosols, solar, and volcanic aerosols via observations through 2005 and then an emission scenario thereafter (RCP6.0, a moderate emissions scenario pathway developed for the upcoming IPCC’s AR5).

Figure 3 – Model results of the 1996-2012 precipitation minus the 1979-1995 precipitation.

The NCAR CAM4 model might be representing the actual climate well for this time period.  Left unsaid in the report is any analysis of the model’s future projections.  Other model studies suggest that the central US could experience 2012-type temperature and precipitation conditions more regularly by the end of the 21st century.

Figure 4 – Model probability density functions of precipitation deficits for the six study states.

This figure suggests that the latter half of the time period (1996-2012) modeled had a higher probability of being drier than did the former half (1979-1995).  The report did not present a potential cause for this shift in probability.  If this probability does not revert back to the 1979-1995 distribution, dry conditions could become a more regular feature of future years.

Figure 5 – Model probability density functions of precipitation surpluses for the six study states.

This figure is not the logical companion to the previous figure.  The probability of being wetter and drier could increase if the overall probability density function existed in a certain way.    This is not the case however.  Instead, the probability of the six states experiencing wetter conditions in the second half of the period studied decreased with respect to the first half.

This report is useful in diagnosing what happened prior to and during the 2012 US drought and in trying to ascertain how predictable such an event might have been.  There is considerable interest in accurately predicting this type of event well in advance so as to prepare those who might be affected.  This capability remains beyond us for now since this event was primarily driven by natural variability enhanced slightly by underlying change.  With climate model projection studies indicating a much warmer and somewhat drier future for this region, stakeholders will likely have to adapt farming and ranching practices.  Similarly, municipalities will have to prepare for extremely dry years in their infrastructure planning and practices.  Of course, future change could be reduced as a result of our efforts to mitigate anthropogenic forcing.  The scale of that endeavor is much larger than most people are aware and thus not likely to take place any time soon.  Climate and energy policies need significant revamping at all levels.

Research: New Land Surface Warming Paper & Post

A quick word and some questions on a SkepticalScience post that discusses yet another warming analysis that comes up with the same answer than other studies have.   The post itself is good if you want a paper summary.  Where I think it needs attention is the “so what” part.  I’ll start with the concluding paragraph because it is what triggered a desire to actually write something about the post instead of walking away from it.

How much more evidence do we need?  The accuracy of the instrumental global surface temperature record is essentially settled science at this point.  The Earth is warming, it’s warming very fast, and continuing to deny this fact is a waste of time.

Many researchers and activists won’t like my answer: we don’t need much more scientific evidence.  Indeed, I would argue that the science largely weighed in years ago and additional information has only provided small-scale refocusing on parts of the issue.  Scientists haven’t discovered anything truly transformative in many years.  Are fields advancing as a result of new observations, methodologies, and expertise.  Yes, but that doesn’t answer Dana’s question.  What climate field advancement will be the one that magically triggers a switch in skeptics’ minds?  What new data set or analysis technique will do the trick?  I argue that no such advancement will ever occur.  Do we really believe that nobody has yet been smart enough to develop the one advancement that unlocks universal understanding of a complex topic?  That’s clearly an absurd assumption, but it seems to permeate this and other similar posts.  The spectrum of people who care about this topic have made up their minds (whether through tribalism or critical thought).  I will not convince any large number of skeptics to accept my argument any more than Hansen, Gore, or McKibben.  And here is where things get raw: strategies that those activists and most others have employed will not convince those people who don’t care about this topic.  As voices get more shrill and combative, more people tune the arguers out.

So if the evidence isn’t the problem, what is?  I believe the problem is the use of climate science as a proxy for a values fight.  Most people are unwilling to identify and fight about their values; it is much easier to throw climate science in the middle of the ring to fight for them.  Skeptics challenge the “facts” because of their beliefs and value system.  Advocates challenge the skeptics because of their beliefs and value system, not because of the “facts”.  Both groups try to bludgeon each other with “facts” and in so doing talk past each other, not to each other.  What concerns do skeptics have regarding climate change; how can advocates listen and address those concerns and vice versa.  Bypassing others’ concerns is the thing that wastes time.  So why do advocates and skeptics do it so much?

Recent Carbon Market News

A couple of carbon market-related news items caught my eye recently.  While not an exhaustive list, these items are important to discuss:
EU Cancels Carbon Auction, Prices Drop
RGGI Nets $106 Million For Clean Energy, May Hit $2 Billion By 2020

The EU auction failed because bids didn’t reach a secret reserve price.  “In the past five years, carbon prices on the ETS have plummeted nearly 90 percent.”  The core problem with the ETS is oversupply of credits.  The article points out possible solutions: backloading or long-term structural change.  I’m not an expert on carbon markets, but my understanding leads me to support the long-term structural change course.  The ETS tried to please too many vested interests simultaneously (too complex) and resulted in pleasing too few while not achieving its core objective of emissions reductions resulting from a market signal.

On the other hand, The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative had its successful 19th auction of CO2 allowances earlier this month.  I wouldn’t characterize it as bad news, but the clearing price of $2.80 per ton, above the reserve price of $1.98 per ton, is too low to directly impact CO2 emissions; it is also lower than the price in Europe and California.  Utilities in the region are switching to cheaper fuel sources because they’re cheaper, not because they emit fewer CO2 emissions.  According to the article, a significant portion (63%) of the $105.9 million in this quarter’s revenue and the $617 million in historical revenue are earmarked for clean energy technologies like energy efficiency, renewables, and climate change adaptation across RGGI’s nine Northeast US member states.  I would certainly like to read a more in-depth analysis of this claim.  Where specifically have the investments gone and what are the results to date?

The RGGI realizes their reserve and clearing price are too low:

Just over a month ago, the RGGI states decided to reduce the 2014 CO2 budget (the “cap” in cap-and-trade) from 165 million to 91 million tons and retire unsold 2012 and 2013 allowances.  This 45% cut is expected to boost allowance prices to $4 per ton in 2013 and up to $10 per ton in 2020, creating billions of new revenue every year. By comparison, RGGI allowance auction clearing prices have never risen higher than $3.51.

That 2020 price is still too low to have much of a direct impact on carbon emissions.  The obvious benefit is the additional revenue however.  The more revenue we have available to invest in innovation and deploy efficient infrastructure and technologies, the more we will decrease CO2 emissions.  The investment portion of the RGGI policy is a positive feature (I have read less about what the EU does with ETS revenue; I don’t claim with certainty that the RGGI system is “better” than the ETS system).  Any national-level tax-and-dividend system will be complex.  But even$20 per ton today would not, absent subsidies, provide enough incentive for utilities to switch from fossil fuels to zero-carbon sources.

State of Polar Sea Ice – March 2013: Annual Arctic Maximum and Antarctic Minimum Reached

For the second time in only six years, and the third time in ten years, global polar sea ice area in February and March 2013 mimicked climatological normal conditions (1979-2009).  This follows January’s improvement from September 2012′s significant negative deviation from normal conditions.  While Antarctic sea ice loss occurred slower than the climatological normal rate, Arctic sea ice gain was more rapid than normal during February.  Polar sea ice recovered from an extensive deficit of 2.5 million sq. km. area late last year to a 0.5 million sq. km. surplus within the last week.

Arctic Sea Ice

According to the NSIDC, weather conditions once again caused less freezing to occur on the Atlantic side of the Arctic Ocean and more freezing on the Pacific side than normal this winter.  Similar conditions occurred during the past six boreal winters.  Sea ice creation during February measured 766,000 sq. km.  Despite this rather rapid growth (38% higher than normal), February′s extent remained well below average for the month.  Instead of measuring near 15.64 million sq. km., February 2013′s average extent was only 14.66 million sq. km., a 980,000 sq. km. difference!  The Arctic likely reached its maximum annual extent about 10 days ago.  In terms of annual maximum values, 2013′s 15.13 million sq. km. was 733,000 lower than normal.February’s relatively high rate of ice formation for February related to the lack of existing sea ice at the beginning of the month.  Without ice already in the Ocean, new ice formed as winter continued.

Barents Sea (Atlantic side) ice finally edged toward its climatological normal value during the month after remaining low this winter, as it did in the past 10 winters.  Kara Sea (Atlantic side) ice recovered from low extent the past couple of months, which is different from February 2012′s conditions.  The Bering Sea (Pacific side), which saw ice extent growth due to anomalous northerly winds in 2011-2012, saw similar conditions in December 2012 through February 2013.  This caused anomalously high ice extent in the Bering Sea again this winter.  As it did previously this winter, a negative phase of the Arctic Oscillation allowed cold Arctic air to move far southward and brought warmer than normal air to move north over parts of the Arctic.  The AO’s tendency toward its negative phase in recent winters is related to the lack of sea ice over the Arctic Ocean in September each fall.

In terms of climatological trends, Arctic sea ice extent in February has decreased by 2.9% per decade, the lowest of any calendar month.  This rate is closest to zero in the late winter/early spring months and furthest from zero in late summer/early fall months.  Note that this rate also uses 1979-2000 as the climatological normal.  There is no reason to expect this rate to change significantly (much more or less negative) any time soon, but increasingly negative rates are likely in the foreseeable future.  Additional low ice seasons will continue.  Some years will see less decline than other years (e.g., 2011) – but the multi-decadal trend is clear: negative.  The specific value for any given month during any given year is, of course, influenced by local and temporary weather conditions.  But it has become clearer every year that humans have established a new climatological normal in the Arctic with respect to sea ice.  This new normal will continue to have far-reaching implications on the weather in the mid-latitudes, where most people live.

Arctic Pictures and Graphs

The following graphic is a satellite representation of Arctic ice as of February 11, 2013:

Figure 1 – UIUC Polar Research Group‘s Northern Hemispheric ice concentration from 20130211.

Here is the similar image from March 24, 2013:

Figure 2 – UIUC Polar Research Group‘s Northern Hemispheric ice concentration from 20130324.

As is normal for this time of year, there is not a large difference between these two graphics.  Any differences are primarily due to storm systems’ presence that push ice around, or the lack thereof.  The lack of sea ice in the Barents Sea (north of Europe) is problematic because wind and ocean currents typically pile sea ice up on the Atlantic side of the Arctic.  Sea ice presence in the Bering Sea (between Alaska and Russia) does not alleviate this problem because currents take ice from that area and transport it into the Arctic and then out into the Atlantic.  The sea ice on the Atlantic side would be among the first that currents transport and then melt during the spring.  With sea ice missing on the Atlantic side, currents will more easily transport Arctic sea ice to southern latitudes where it melts.

Many people questioned the overall health of the Arctic ice pack earlier this month when images (like the one below) and video documented extensive cracks in the ice in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas.  A fellow blogger (and new author!) emailed me about this phenomenon and I wrote that I would blog my thoughts on the topic.  As Andrew Freedman wrote, “According to the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) in Boulder, Colo., this fracturing event appears to be related to a storm that passed over the North Pole on Feb. 8, 2013, creating strong off-shore ice motion. The event is unusual but not unheard of, as similar patterns were seen in early 2011 and 2008. However, the NSIDC said the fracturing this time is more extensive.”  The worry is the extent and size of the cracks and leads as well as the early calendar date at which they are all appearing – up to weeks before normal.

I found this article on the topic and agree with Greg Laden, the author.  The cracks and leads  might be a big deal or they might not.  We will have to wait until the minimum sea ice extent occurs in September before we issue judgment.  The scientifically sound course of action would be to wait until early cracks appeared in multiple seasons and then see what the range of response later in the year is.  For all we know, the cracks could allow for even more ice to form in March than normal and delay the onset of melting.  It strikes me as scientifically unsound and even irresponsible to conjecture about the existence and effect of processes, which we do not understand well.  If scientists crow about upcoming devastating Arctic sea ice loss this year and reality doesn’t conform to their wishes, how much credibility with the public do they engender?  I think observers should stay patient and discuss the phenomena and effects we do understand – there is plenty of material with which to work!

Figure 3 – NOAA AVHRR infrared picture of Arctic sea ice on 20130312.

The following graph of Arctic ice volume from the end of February demonstrates:

Figure 4 – PIOMAS Arctic sea ice volume time series through February 2013.

As the graph shows, volume (length*width*height) hit another record minimum in June 2012.  Moreover, the volume remains far from normal since it just returned to the -2 standard deviation envelope (light gray).  I understand that most readers don’t have an excellent handle on statistics, but conditions between -1 and -2 standard deviations are rare and conditions outside the -2 standard deviation threshold (see the line below the shaded area on the graph above) are incredibly rare: the chances of 3 of them occurring in 3 subsequent years under normal conditions are extraordinarily low (you have a better chance of winning the Powerball than this).  Hence my assessment that “normal” conditions in the Arctic are shifting from what they were in the past few centuries; a new normal is developing.  Note further that the ice volume anomaly returned to near the -1 standard deviation envelope in early 2011, early 2012, and now early 2013.  In each of the previous two years, volume fell rapidly outside of the -2 standard deviation area with the return of summer.  That means that natural conditions are not the likely cause; rather, another cause is much more likely to be responsible for this behavior: human influence.

Arctic Sea Ice Extent

Take a look at February’s areal extent time series data:

Figure 5 – NSIDC Arctic sea ice extent time series through late March 2013 compared with last five years’ data and climatological norm (dark gray line) and standard deviation envelope (light gray).

As you can see, this year’s extent (light blue cuve) grew more rapidly in December than February.  This graph also shows that this year’s extent remained at historically low levels through the winter, well below average values (thick gray curve), just as it did in the previous five winters, which are also shown on this graph.  In this month’s version, NSIDC also plotted the previous four years’ data (2008 through 2012).  You can also see what happened to conditions during late March and early April last spring (dark green curve).  A late season freeze surge occurred, which delayed the date of maximum extent by a number of weeks.  Last year’s surge has no bearing on what might happen over the next couple of weeks this year.  Weather conditions and some low-frequency climate oscillations (AO) are different this year and have more bearing on ice conditions than last year’s date of maximum extent.

Antarctic Pictures and Graphs

Here is a satellite representation of Antarctic sea ice conditions from February 11, 2013:

Figure 6– UIUC Polar Research Group‘s Southern Hemispheric ice concentration from 20130211.

And here is the corresponding graphic from March 24, 2013:

Figure 7 – UIUC Polar Research Group‘s Southern Hemispheric ice concentration from 20130324.

Ice growth is easily visible around the continent.  There is more Antarctic sea ice today than there normally is on this date in the year.  The reason for this is the extra ice in the Weddell Sea (east of the Antarctic Peninsula that juts up toward South America).  This ice exists this austral summer due to an anomalous atmospheric circulation pattern: persistent high pressure west of the Weddell sea pushed sea ice north.  The same winds that pushed the sea ice north also moved cold Antarctic air over the Sea, which has kept ice melt rate well below normal.  A similar mechanism helped sea ice form in the Bering Sea so far this winter.  Where did the anomalous winds come from?  We can again point to a climatic relationship.

The difference between the noticeable and significant long-term Arctic ice loss and relative lack of Antarctic ice loss is largely and somewhat confusingly due to the ozone depletion that took place over the southern continent in the 20th century.  This depletion has caused a colder southern polar stratosphere than it otherwise would be, reinforcing the polar vortex over the Antarctic Circle.  This is almost exactly the opposite dynamical condition than exists over the Arctic with the negative phase of the Arctic Oscillation.  The southern polar vortex has helped keep cold, stormy weather in place over Antarctica that might not otherwise would have occurred to the same extent and intensity. The vortex and associated anomalous high pressure centers kept ice and cold air over places such as the Weddell Sea this year.

As the “ozone hole” continues to recover during this century, the effects of global warming will become more clear in this region, especially if ocean warming continues to melt sea-based Antarctic ice from below (subs. req’d).  The strong Antarctic polar vortex will likely weaken back to a more normal state and anomalous high pressure centers that keep ice flowing into the ocean will not form as often.  For now, we should perhaps consider the lack of global warming signal due to lack of ozone as relatively fortunate.  In the next few decades, we will have more than enough to contend with from Greenland ice sheet melt.  Were we to face a melting West Antarctic Ice Sheet at the same time, we would have to allocate many more resources.  Of course, in a few decades, we’re likely to face just such a situation.

Finally, here is the Antarctic sea ice extent time series through mid-March:

Figure 8 – NSIDC Antarctic sea ice extent time series through late March 2013.

Policy

Given the lack of climate policy development to date, Arctic conditions will likely continue to deteriorate for the foreseeable future.  The Arctic Ocean will soak up additional energy (heat) from the Sun due to lack of reflective sea ice.  Additional energy in the climate system creates cascading and nonlinear effects throughout the system.  For instance, excess energy pushes the Arctic Oscillation to a more negative phase, which allows anomalously cold air to pour south over Northern Hemisphere land masses while warm air moves over the Arctic during the winter.  This in turn impacts weather patterns throughout the year across the mid-latitudes.

More worrisome for long-term concerns is the heat that impacts land-based ice.  As glaciers and ice sheets melt, sea-level rise occurs.  Beyond the increasing rate of sea-level rise due to thermal expansion (excess energy, see above), storms have more water to push onshore as they move along coastlines.  We can continue to react to these developments as we’ve mostly done so far and allocate billions of dollars in relief funds because of all the human infrastructure lining our coasts.  Or we can be proactive, minimize future global effects, and reduce societal costs.  The choice remains ours.

Errata

Here are my State of Polar Sea Ice posts from February and January 2013. For further comparison, here is my State of Polar Sea Ice post from March 2012.

Update

I meant to include the following two graphs in this post because of the historical nature they represent.

Figure 9 – Time series of Arctic sea ice area from UIUC from 1979 to Sep. 18, 2012.

Figure 10 – Time series of Arctic sea ice area from UIUC from 1979 to Mar. 25, 2013.

The difference between these two graphics is obvious since they were taken near the time of minimum area (2012) and maximum area (2013).  In terms of magnitude, the freeze season of 2012-2013 produced the highest amount of frozen ice area in the modern record (11.168 million sq. km.).  The value of ice area last September was the lowest on record and the value of ice area earlier this month was the highest in four years.  March’s area value occurred because of the factors I discussed above that boil down to this: the relative lack of thick ice in recent winters permitted rapid ice growth, albeit thin ice that melts quickly the following year.  In addition to new record low area values in the future, significant oscillations from minimum to maximum and back again are likely to occur in the future as well.  This does not contradict climate change; it is a manifestation of climate change.  I hope write more about this topic soon, but countries are reconstructing international policy (military and economic) as a result of the changes seen in the Arctic.  Those policy shifts will have societal repercussions, which I venture say few people realize today.

Extreme Weather, Climate Change, and Public Reporting

If you have had any exposure to this subject, you probably already have your mind made up about my title. As I’ve gained exposure, via multiple disciplines, I’ve changed my mind. And that allows me to look at climate reporting in new ways.  Take this article and interview for instance. It’s meta-related, masked by the climate’s relationship to extreme weather. There are thousands of examples of conservatives ignoring science when it suits them. Doing so actually has more to do with conservatives operating from their value system. Are there similar examples of others ignoring science when it similarly suits them? I think it would be foolhardy to assume otherwise. Here is what I think about this article.

First, the mask: climate-extreme weather. There is no documented causal relationship between the two. In fact, the number of identified causal relationships between climate change and anything is still relatively small. There is a strong temperature signal. There is a growing ocean acidification signal. The sea level change signal is small but present and growing. How about precipitation? Nothing definitive. How about snowstorms? Nothing definitive.

But those signals are small against much stronger climate signals. Would something like drought or hurricanes or floods or tornadoes exhibit a stronger signal. In a word, no. There simply is not a detectable climate and extreme weather link today. That is not to say a future signal will not exist – there very well might be. But as of today, there is not. What science backs up that claim? The 2008 U.S. Climate Change Science Program’s Synthesis Report for starters (p.42; 2.2.2.1):

When averaged across the entire United States (Figure 2.6), there is no clear tendency for a trend based on the PDSI. Similarly, long-term trends (1925-2003) of hydrologic droughts based on model derived soil moisture and runoff show that droughts have, for the most part, become shorter, less frequent, and cover a smaller portion of the U. S. over the last century (Andreadis and Lettenmaier, 2006).

So as of the early 21st century, U.S. droughts have become less severe, not more. The IPCC’s global analysis on extreme events concurred (p.171):

There is not enough evidence at present to suggest high confidence in observed trends in dryness due to lack of direct observations, some geographical inconsistencies in the trends, and some dependencies of inferred trends on the index choice. There is medium confidence that since the 1950s some regions of the world have experienced more intense and longer droughts (e.g., southern Europe, west Africa) but also opposite trends exist in other regions (e.g., central North America, northwestern Australia).

One big impediment to our extreme event trend ascertainment is our basic inability to monitor events in the first place. But based on the observations made, there is, in the IPCC’s own language, only medium confidence that droughts in some areas of the world are increasing in severity while decreasing in other places. Is climate change increasing extreme events? Not droughts – not yet.

What about storms like Sandy or Katrina (note: the former was a tropical system that changed to an extratropical system at landfall while the latter was a full-fledged hurricane at landfall)? There is at this time no global trend in hurricane frequency or intensity that demonstrates a clear causal relationship to climate change. There are indexes that a few scientists have developed to examine the data in different ways with differing results, but they require fairly complex methodologies to calculate. If I created my own index that demonstrated a relationship between the type of food I ate and climate change, does one cause the other? Certainly not directly. The hurricane-climate change relationship should exhibit a detectable signal in 50 more years or so. Until then, scientists cannot confidently say the data supports such a relationship. Extratropical storms increased in strength a little over the past century, although the locations of increase are limited. Their frequency has not increased.

Quickly, the same thing holds for floods and tornadoes. Datasets are simply too limited in space and time to currently identify a robust relationship.

As I wrote above, there are clear signals that we have already detected. The effects of those signals are mostly well-known, although some surprises are certainly in store for the planet. Extreme weather is not one of those signals. At least, not yet. If people are concerned about the level of inaction taken on climate change to date, it is folly to chase down or exaggerate signals that do not yet exist. If arguments based on signals detected are not enough to propel action, then we need to address their sets of values and how we communicate them. Fear-mongering and purposeful ignorance of science are not adequate substitutes.

Finally, I question the following from the article:

“I quote the climate skeptics or deniers — whatever term you prefer — when they’re relevant. So when I’m doing a piece about the science itself and what the latest scientific findings are, especially if that’s a short piece, I don’t necessarily feel obliged to quote the climate skeptics the same way that if you were doing a story about evolution, a New York Times reporter wouldn’t feel obliged to call up a creationist and ask them what they think. On the other hand, the climate skeptics are politically relevant at this point in American history [in a way that] the creationists are not, for example. So we have a fair chunk of the Congress … that sees political traction right now in questioning climate science or purporting not to believe it, so in a political story or in a longer story, I usually do give some amount of space to the climate skeptics.”

This quote comes from Justin Gillis, who writes about climate change for The New York Times. Does any of the above evidence make it into his interview with NPR? Here is my question: is Mr. Gillis a climate change writer or a politics writer? Scientific climate change writers should focus on the science. If Mr. Gillis wants to be a political climate change writer, he and the NYT owe it to their readers to make that distinction clear. Especially when double standards are applied to a different type of science writing. I would argue that creationists have a considerable amount of political traction right now also. I do not agree with their viewpoint, but if Mr. Gillis and the NYT want to write comparison pieces and not news pieces, I do not see why that effort should stop at climate change.

CO Public Utilities Commission Rejects Xcel Energy’s Bid To Collect Remaining $16.6 Million in SmartGridCity Costs

I last wrote on this topic a couple of months ago, following a Denver Post article that started with a Judge’s decision that ratepayers should not be responsible for cost overruns associated with Xcel’s SmartGridCity program.  The judge’s decision was not the final step in the matter.  As a matter of course, the final step was the Colorado’s Public Utilities’ Commission decision whether to grant Xcel’s request to collect $16.6 million from Colorado ratepayers.

If this is the first time you’ve read about this, here is a short history.  In 2008, Xcel proposed SmartGridCity, in which they would install approximately 50,000 smart meters in the city of Boulder by year’s end.  It was one of the most ambitious smart grid projects announced at the time.  Xcel’s proposal totaled $15 million in costs, which they themselves would completely bear.  Seven partner companies were supposed to pay for the remainder of the $100 million project.  A little something called the Great Recession got in the way, along with little transparency and project mismanagement on Xcel’s part.  Today, 23,000 smart meters are installed – at a cost of $44.5 million, triple the original estimate for less than half the project deployment.  The PUC previously approved Xcel’s request for $27.9 million, which is currently collected through customer rates, not from Xcel’s assets.

Thankfully, the PUC decided today to reject Xcel’s request with prejudice, which means Xcel cannot appeal the decision.  I support this decision mainly because I do not think Xcel should saddle regional ratepayers with costs for benefits they cannot receive.  That is a disgusting business practice and terrible precedent to set for future projects.  In a similar vein, Xcel’s success in expanding a coal plant in Pueblo, CO seemed to many to be a grab at capital to pad profit.  Ratepayers overwhelmingly rejected the plant’s expansion because it would generate more electricity than demanded by the population as well as its long life: Xcel stuck CO with this expanded plant for the next 50 years.

I have expressed my frustration with the PUC on occasion.  I do not think they exert the appropriate level of oversight over Xcel when the energy utility asks for rate increases, especially given Xcel’s lack of correctly forecasting generation capacity or demand.  This decision doesn’t atone for past decisions I didn’t agree with, but I am glad of this result.

I reiterate my general support for the smart grid.  I think we will eventually witness a significant transformation of the US’s power sector, including its infrastructure.  Smart grid technologies could usher in an era of increased efficiency.  Energy consumers currently do not have much access to data on their usage.  Many (not all) people could change their consumption habits if they had access to that data.

US Carbon Intensity

I saw this article today – “US Getting More Economic Bang for Its Energy Buck” and wanted to make some observations about it.  The article contains the following assertion:

Energy intensity, or the amount of energy we use to create one dollar of GDP, has plummeted 58 percent between 1949 and 2011. Even more impressive is the 66 percent decrease in carbon intensity, or the amount of carbon emitted per real dollar of GDP.

The data are what the data are.  This comment follows the data:

These improvements are what greens miss when they call for Americans to make painful, costly cutbacks on energy usage.

Let’s take another look at that data, now that we know the bias of the author.  There are 62 years in the data cited.  That means there was a 0.94% annual decrease in energy intensity. The good news is there was a decrease. We generated the same GDP dollar for less energy, as we expect in an advanced society with research and innovation.  Similarly, there was a 1.06% reduction in carbon intensity. This value is important for energy and climate policy. The amount of carbon required for every GDP dollar fell over the past 62 years. Again, this is a good thing generally speaking. Technological efficiency permeated the economy over that time, which reduced the amount of carbon we emitted.

Now an important question: What caused this decrease? Was it emission reductions? No, US emissions have increased since 1950, with only a couple of periods when emission values didn’t increase every year. The US emitted just over 600 million metric tons (MMT) of carbon in 1950 and over 1500MMT in 2011. If carbon intensity is a measure of carbon per unit GDP, then the denominator increased faster than the numerator (GDP rather than carbon), in order for the ratio to decline over time. In 1950, the US real GDP was $2 trillion; in 2011, it was $13 trillion. Indeed, GDP increased faster than carbon emissions over the past 60 years.

What magnitude carbon intensity decrease is necessary to achieve carbon concentration reductions? First of all, carbon emissions have to decrease. Granted this has to occur globally, but let’s keep our focus on the US since we can actually control those emissions. Something between 3% and 4% annual decrease would do the trick. That is 3 to 4 times the historical rate! Let’s go back to the ratio: what has to change to achieve this decrease? It’s one of two things: carbon emissions or GDP. If GDP increases at the same rate it has historically, carbon emissions would have to decrease in value. If carbon emissions increased at the same rate they have historically, GDP would have to triple or quadruple in value.  The former case is more likely because while we want GDP to grow as much as possible, tripling or quadrupling the rate of GDP growth won’t happen.

So our goal should be to decrease carbon emissions. If we can simultaneously increase GDP along the way, so much the better. We obviously should not look at “solutions” that decrease GDP. Walter Russell is unfortunately partially correct when he says that some greens miss part of reality. They place too much focus on decreasing emissions regardless of the consequences. In the real world, people still have to eat and pay for the mortgage. Walter does miss his own share of reality however. These graphs do not indicate a wildly efficient economy. We should not break out into celebration because of the graphs. We should instead examine them soberly and then determine what our goals should be. Do we want to decrease emissions and concentrations and if so to what level? Those goals will help us establish the requisite policies to achieve them. I for one do not think we are decarbonizing nearly fast enough and I think we can decarbonize faster via some common sense policies.